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THE EFFECT OF AEC/NRC REGULATION
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR STEAM POWER
David L. Bodde
TRW Energy Systems Group
McLean, Virginia

Abstract
Changing regulatory requirements were an important influence on the
technological development of the Nuclear Steam Supply System. Man
ufacturers felt this influence primarily through increased require
ments for information processing rather than through technical
changes in the hardware. Regulatory change was driven by: the
rapid growth of nuclear plant size; delays in critical safety re
search; public uncertainty regarding how safe nuclear plants should
be; the extreme consequences of a nuclear accident; and strong
pressure for the rapid commercialization of nuclear power.
1.

REGULATION AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

throughout the commercial development of

Regulatory product standards are imposed

nuclear power.

through the political process when the a

lative magnitude of these changes can be

An impression of the re

action of the market fails to provide the

gained from Figure 1.

product performance desired by the public.

NSSS manufacturer, Westinghouse, perceived

The influence of these regulations on tech

the impact of AEC/NRC regulatory changes.

nological change is growing rapidly as more

Not only did the regulations as expressed

This shows how one

products become subject to regulation and

in Title 10, CFR change, but their inter

as the intensity of that regulation in

pretation changed as well.

creases.

By 1972,

Nuclear energy in particular was

Regulatory Guides, the means by which the

developed from its earliest days under the

NRC interprets the regulations for Licen

aegis of the Atomic Energy Commission

sees, had come to dominate changes in

(AEC) and its regulatory successor the

Title 10, CFR.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

This

paper discusses how AEC and NRC regulations
have influenced the commercial development

All this occurred during

a period in which on-line nuclear generat
ing capacity grew by a factor of 10.
2.

REGULATION AND THE NSSS

of the principal manufactured component
of nuclear power - the Nuclear Steam Supply
System (NSSS).

Numerous studies in related high-technology
industries suggest that standardization
can be inhibited when the performance re

It is generally recognized that the re

quired of the product changes frequently

quirements which governed the design, man
ufacture, and operation of nuclear power
plants changed frequently and in the

and in important ways.

Thus,, it was

hypotehsized that continually changing
regulatory requirements might inhibit the

direction of greater technical difficulty
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standardization of the NSSS.

economics of large plants, a strategy not

This, in

turn, would restrain the increases in pro

unlike the well known "curve-tipping"

duction efficiency which typically occur

practiced in turbine-generators.

as a product matures.

factors enabled the NSSS vendors to pursue

The evidence, how

Two

ever, reveals that the effects of regula

this strategy.

tion were far more subtle and complex.

tion by utility managements that the demand

2.1

REGULATION AND NSSS HARDWARE CHANGE

The first was the percep

for electricity would continue to grow
rapidly and predictably.

Thus, excess

Changing regulatory requirements did not

capacity would not be a barrier to the in

emerge as a major source of technological

vestment in larger nuclear plants.

change in the NSSS hardware, at least from

second factor was the lack of operating

The

the perspective of the PWR manufacturers.

experience with large reactors.

Figure 2 presents the results of a series

it was suspected by some that the extra

of interviews with engineers and managers

polation of size over experience might

at Combustion Engineering, Babcock &

cause economic and technical problems,

Wilcox, and Westinghouse.

there was no way to demonstrate this in the

Each check

Although

summarizes the perception of one firm of

absence of operating experience.

the regulatory influence on technological

together with a long tradition among

change.

electric utilities of achieving efficiency

This influence was felt to be

This,

insignificant except for the reactor core

through size, made it difficult for vendors

and instrumentation and controls.

offering smaller plants to win utility

In the

core, for example, the Interim Acceptance

bids.

Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling

of Figure 4.

The result was the "horsepower race"

Systems (ECCS) reversed what had been a
major design objective - increased thermal
performance from each fuel rod.

This is

shown in Figure 3 for representative
Combustion Engineering power plants.

As

NSSS vendors were forced to increase the
number of rods in a fuel assembly in order
in increased core cost.

factor, it is not surprising that it
should be a major source of technical

a result of dimished performance per rod,

to maintain power density.

Since capacity was an important competitive

This resulted

However, these

change in the NSSS.

The perspective of

the PWR manufacturers, Figure 5, confirms
this.

In every component other than

instrumentation and controls, capacity
growth rather than regulation was cited as
the major source of technological change.

changes were generally implemented inside

2.3

NSSS STANDARDIZATION

the envelope of a standard fuel assembly.

Most of the hardware changes which re

Safety and auxiliary systems were also

sulted from the growth in NSSS capacity

strongly affected.

were oriented toward the scale-up of

2.2

existing equipment.

CAPACITY GROWTH IN THE NSSS

Rather than regulation, the principal

at greater efficiency in the design and

source of technical change in NSSS hard
ware was capacity growth.

This did not discour

age the component standardization aimed
production process.

As shown in

Thus, the NSSS of the

larger firms evolved from an essentially

Figure 4, the Mwe rating of nuclear plants

custom-built product toward a modular

grew by a factor of 6 during the 1960's.

configuration.

This was a result of competition among

At Westinghouse, for

example, several NSSS components had

NSSS vendors which emphasized the scale
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become identical across, a wide product
line by 1974. As Figure 6 shows, steam

tions was far more subtle and pervasive

generators, main coolant pumps, and cool

in the NSSS hardware alone. Much evidence
suggests that the principal effect of

than can be discerned by study of changes

ant pump motors became standard components
applied across the Westinghouse product

these regulations on the NSSS manufacturer

line.

was the increased requirement for inform
ation processing.

All fuel assemblies consisted of

standard fuel rods bound (with one excep
tion) in a 17 by 17 matrix.

Control rods

and drive mechanisms were identical except
that greater numbers were required for the

This burden was felt in two ways.

The

first was through technical justification
and analysis aimed at demonstrating to

larger reactors. All other components
differed principally in size.

the AEC/NRC that reactors operating or
in the licensing process continued to be

The smaller NSSS manufacturers, however,

adequate despite the changing regulatory

had not adopted the extended product line

requirements. The second was through
quality assurance.

as of 1974.

Babcock and Wilcox, for

example, evolved through a series of
2.4.1

standard designs in a one-entry product
line.

Technical Justification and
Analysis

The most obvious way in which AEC/NRC
There is absolutely no evidence that

regulations added to the analysis burden

changing regulatory requirements inhibited

of the NSSS vendors was through statutory

the standardization of the NSSS.

To the

changes.

Major changes in ECCS/LOCA*

contrary, the changing requirements may

criteria, new requirements to mitigate

well have been an incentive toward stand
ardization. Once a component had been

common mode failures, changes deriving
from the fuel densification problem, and

thoroughly analyzed and accepted by the

the requirement to reduce radioactive

AEC/NRC, there was a strong incentive not

emissions to the lowest practicable level

to make changes that would provoke a new

were foremost among these statutory

wave of regulatory difficulties.

changes.

In this

manner, regulation implicitly raised the
cost of technological change.

But AEC/NRC regulation also

influenced technical analysis and justi
fication in a second, more subtle way.

Other factors which favored NSSS standard

This was through changes in the amount of

ization were:

information needed to guide each success

(1) high development costs

for reactors and components,

ive NSSS through its licensing process.

(2) high

backlogs relative to capacity which placed

These information requirements came to

a premium on production and suggested to

dominate the requirements imposed by

the manufacturers that tinkering with the
and (3) the "catch-up" strategy of manu

statutory changes because of the unique
way in which regulation and commercial
development interacted.

facturers who entered the nuclear market

It is a remarkable feature of the nuclear

late and pursued standardization in order
to build experience quickly.

industry that the design and construction

2.4

*"ECCS" refers to the Emergency Core
Cooling System which is intended to miti
gate the effects of a Loss of Coolant
Accident, or "LOCA".

product was not necessary to build sales,

THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON THE NSSS:
INFORMATION PROCESSING

The influence of changing AEC/NRC regula
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of power reactors proceeded in parallel

increased power of computers and their

with the resolution of important regula

application to the modeling of safety-

tory issues.

related NSSS performance were seen by the

For example, a former safe

ty and licensing manager observed that

industry as providing the AEC with a

many safety issues remained outstanding

greater question-asking capability.

when his first NSSS reached the construc
tion permit stage of licensing.

However,

The experience of one manufacturer,
Westinghouse, with AEC questions arising

the AEC recognized that it "... couldn't

after the docketing of its license appli

hold up the construction permit forever."

cations is shown in Figure 7.

Thus the permit was granted, and the NSSS
vendor continued to work on these issues

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety

while preparing its second license appli
cation.

The horizon

tal axis represents the year in which the
(ACRS) approved the Preliminary Safety

This procedure was followed on

Analysis Report for each license applica

the first half dozen applications.

tion.

The vertical axis represents the

One outcome of this unique procedure was

number of additional technical questions

the vulnerability of the nuclear industry

which Westinghouse was required to address.

to technological surprise, discussed in

It is clear from Figure 7 that the require

paragraph 3.1.3.

ments for additional information had risen

Another was the contin

ued need of the regulators in the AEC to

sharply by 1974.

ask for additional technical information

is the fact that they have continued to

in order to process license applications.

rise after specific AEC actions were taken

As early as 1966, Marvin M. Mann, the

to stabilize the information requirements

AEC1s Director of Regulation for Nuclear

through standard formats for Safety

Perhaps more significant

Safety, remarked,* "The amount of infor

Analysis Reports.

mation, that should be required at the con

unsuccessful because new safety-related

struction permit state is presently not

issues arose continually.

well defined.
ment."

It is a matter of judg

The impact on the reactor firms of in

In fact the amount of information

creased demands for technical justifica

continued to be poorly defined throughout

tion was felt in three areas:

most of the period of commercial NSSS
development.
that:** " . . .

These actions were

the growth

of the staff necessary to interface with

In 1973, the AEC noted

the AEC/NRC; the need for engineering man

the Regulatory Staff has

power; and a substantial increase in the

found that most safety analysis reports,

amount of computer analysis.

as initially submitted, provide insuffic
Growth in safety and licensing staff.

ient information to permit the staff to

The

history of the safety and licensing organ

initiate its review, and it has been

ization of one firm suggests the influence

necessary for the staff to make specific

of the information processing requirements.

requests for additional information."

This safety and licensing group was estab
These questions became more and more

lished in the early 1960's with a staff

detailed as the AEC regulatory organiza
tion grew in size and sophistication.

of two to three people.

The firm then had

The

*M. Mann.
"The Government's Role and Current Policies," Proceedings
of the American Power Conference, Vol. 28, 1966, pp. 293-296.
**U.S . Atomic Energy Commission.
Reactors and Related Facilities.

The Safety of Nuclear Power
WASH-1250, July 1973, p. 3-12.
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orders for three NSSS'.

Most of the

backfitted with additional safety devices.

staff's time was devoted to the licensing

Even if plant construction had proceeded

process and to maintaining liaison with

to the point where the optimal solution

the customer and the AEC.

was infeasible, a second method could

In those days

it was hoped that a standard license

usually be negotiated with the AEC.

If

application could be quickly developed.

this failed, the draconian penalty would

This would give the firm a competitive

be downgrading of the plant's rated power.

advantage and help compensate for its

Since a power downgrading was probably

lack of experience in the nuclear busi

costly in contractual terms and was acknow

ness.

ledged to be costly in terms of reputation

The initial response from the AEC

was favorable.

However, new safety

great pains were taken to justify the

questions soon arose, and generic licen

existing designs.

sing was never implemented.

The pressures to justify existing designs

Soon the group's workload began to grow

and the growing number of AEC questions

in response to two forces.

began to consume many man-hours and

First, the

number of NSSS orders increased rapidly

require constant, specialized attention.

as the nuclear market began its rapid,

By the late 1960's the organization had

early growth.

split into a separate safety group (about

More importantly, the

workload per plant increased even though

six people) and licensing group (about

the firm kept the basic design of all its

four people).

early plants the same.

The growing work

The safety group would deal

in generic issues affecting several plants

load per plant derived from the method by

at once.

which this company (and all other NSSS

vide direct interface with the AEC and the

vendors) pursued the technical develop

customer.

ment of its reactors in the face of unre

ment responsibility for each license

solved safety issues.

application.

Since many technological questions

was drawn from the remainder of the engin

remained open, very conservative design

eering staff when necessary.

assumptions were made regarding every

By 1968 the safety group had grown to

aspect of the NSSS.

about 12 people and the licensing group to

It was hoped that

The licensing group would pro
It would assume project manage
As before, technical backup

these assumptions would be sufficiently

about 8.

conservative to absorb whatever technolog

tained roughly 24 and the licensing group

By 1970 the safety group con

ical surprises developed during the period

15.

needed for the plants to become operation
al. The burden of the safety and licens

rapid expansion in the late 1960's.
First, the firm introduced two new NSSS

ing group was to show that the design

designs (one of which was dropped after

assumptions remained valid.

only four units had been sold).

Three reasons were given for the

Second,

The risks inherent in this procedure were

it was necessary to provide witnesses and

not believed excessive by the NSSS

technical backup for appearances before

vendors.

the quasi-judicial Atomic Safety and

For one thing, the initial

designs were so conservative that the

Licensing Boards.

firm could usually show that they remained
adequate, despite the later introduction

by the AEC probed into greater design
detail.

of new safety .issues.

In the 1970's, both the licensing and

In cases where

doubt remained, plants could always be
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Third, the questions

safety groups began to fragment into

additional sub-units each of which

justification and analysis in support of

addressed a particular licensing or safe

regulatory requirements.

ty problem.

In safety, for example,

of the total engineering staff is a second

separate sub-units were organized to

manifestation of the increased information

address control problems, loss of coolant

processing burden.

accident (LOCA) problems, and general
safety analysis.

Computer analysis.

The total strength of

Finally, the amount of

computer analysis required per NSSS is a

these units was about 37 professionals in

third indication of the amount of technical

1975. The licensing group was organized
into three distinct units, one which

justification and analysis.

At Combustion

Engineering, the computer usage grew from
about 500 hours in 1967 to 5000-6000 hours

assists the utility in obtaining its con
struction permit and operating license,

in 1972 to 13,000 to 16,000 hours in 1975.
Even this, however, understates the

one which supports the regulatory problem
of completed plants, and one which studies
generic licensing issues.

Thus, the size

requirements for analysis.

The strength

For one thing,

the computer work in 1967 was done on a

of the licensing unit was 21 professionals
in 1975.

CDC 6600, while the later work was done on

In total, the safety and licensing staff

al capacity.

had grown to about 60 people by 1975.

grams became available in later years so

a CDC 7600 with a much larger computation

In

Also, more efficient pro

that year the firm had 18 NSSS' in an

the firm was able to get more computation

active status.

per hour.

Thus, roughly three staff

members were required for each active NSSS

Finally, the balance of com

puter usage shifted from commercial

in 1975 as opposed to less than one in

analysis to regulatory analysis.

1966.

virtually all the computer time was

This threefold increase in the size

In 1967

of the group most closely in contact with

devoted to core analysis pursuant to

the AEC is a direct manifestation of the

commercial objectives.

increased burden of information process

40% of the time was used solely for safety

By 1975, about

ing .

analysis.

Engineering manpower.

neutron physics calculations, many of

An analysis, of the

Another 40% was devoted to

remainder of the engineering staff in the

which provided basic inputs to the safety

same firm showed that the number of

analysis.

scientists and engineers per active NSSS

2.4.2

remained roughly constant from 1967 to
1973.

The second principal way in which regula

This would seem surprising in view

tion increased the requirements for infor

of the evidence of increased standardiza
tion of the NSSS.

mation processing was quality assurance

In principle, product

(QA).

standardization should reduce the need
for engineering staff.

This is essentially an administra

tive task aimed at ensuring the AEC/NRC's

The reduction was

"first line of safety," the prevention of

apparently not felt in this case because

accidents through high quality design,

the engineering staff was required to

manufacture, construction, and operation.

provide analytical support to the safety
and licensing group.

Quality Assurance

The QA concept has grown in depth and

The Chief Scientist

scope since the earliest days of nuclear

of another NSSS manufacturer estimated

power.

that his engineering staff spends from

In terms of depth, the procedures

have become more specific and detailed;

30% to 50% of its time providing technical
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in terms of scope, they have grown to

enormously.

encompass more power plant components and

Two aspects of this documentation added to

operating procedures.

the administrative burden.

The first was

Quality assurance was first codified in

inspection.

1967 when the AEC published its initial

and checks on checks was carried out by

"General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power

the reactor firms and monitored by the

Plant Construction Permits."

AEC.

Criterion 1

of the 70 was a generally worded statement

A rigorous program of checks

The second was traceability.

Critical components had to be traced back

of the AEC's desire that QA be incorpor

to the mill from which the material origi

ated into the design and construction of

nated.

nuclear power plants.

of these in the latest Combustion Engin

The description was

Fuel rods (there are over 56,000

brief, and much room was left for inter

eering core, for example) became serial

pretation .

numbered items, completely traceable for

Apparently, however, more explicit QA

the original and all reload cores.

criteria were felt desirable, and in 1969

One result of this was growth of the QA

the AEC proposed new rules spelling out

staff.

the quality assurance procedures.

QA staff in 1969 consisted of 4 persons

These

In one of the firms studied, the

were published in 1970 as Appendix B to

who monitored QA procedures for 11 active

10 CFR Part 50.

NSSS'.

The new regulation

By 1975 the staff had grown to

included a definition of QA and 18 criter

35 and the workload to 19 NSSS'.

ia which told what a QA system should do.

growth seemed characteristic of the other

This is the regulation under which quality

reactor firms.

assurance is now carried out in the

2.4.3

This

The Costs of Information Processing

nuclear industry.
The accounting practices of the NSSS
There is some evidence which suggests that

manufacturers were not amenable to pre

much of the cost of QA was borne by the
utilities.

cise quantification of the cost of infor

For one thing, the AEC as a

mation processing.

matter of policy held the utilities
responsible for quality assurance from the
earliest days of nuclear power.

which these costs fall.

For

have in the absence of regulation and at

power business without a great deal of

least 8% more.

experience in QA procedures, and the

not sufficient to explain the dramatic ■

But the evidence also

escallation in nuclear plant cost of

indicates quality assurance was a major

recent years.

cost factor for the NSSS vendors as well.

We must look to the bal

ance of plant for a complete understand

Quality assurance directly affects NSSS

ing of these costs.

hardware costs through requirements for

Further research is needed here, but

But more important was the impact

circumstantial evidence suggests that

of QA on the administration of the NSSS
production process.

Thus, the increase in

NSSS cost attributable to regulation is

fixed cost of developing such procedures

rework.

By 1974, an

NSSS cost at most 35% more than it would

another, the utilities entered the nuclear

may have been high.

It was, however,

possible to estimate the range within

regulatory changes may have been most

In general terms, the

strongly felt in the balance of plant.

product itself remained largely unchanged

Some observations:

while its documentation increased
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•

Statistical studies strongly asso
ciate high costs with lengthly
plant licensing periods.

0

The NSSS has declined as a fraction
of plant cost from 14.3% in 1970
to 12.9% in 1974.

3.1

TECHNOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING AND
SAFETY

Two principal factors seemed to underlie

«

Construction labor increased from
3 to 4 man-hours per KWe in the
mid-1960's to 11 to 12 man-hours
per KWe by 1973.

the inability of the nuclear industry to
demonstrate the safety of its product:
the growth in reactor size which was
accomplished by undertaking large technol
ogical risks, and the failure of the AEC
to pursue critical safety experiments.

•

Architect/engineer services rose
from .5 man-hour per KWe in 1967
to 1.4 man-hours/kwe by 1973.

3.1.1

Growth in Reactor Size

As Figure 4 shows, by 1968 the reactor
®

3.0

The amount of concrete and steel
per KWe fell initially, but in
creased by the late 1960's.
THE SOURCES OF REGULATORY CHANGE

firms were taking orders for NSSS of 1200
MWe capacity when the largest one with
significant operational experience was
rated at 200 MWe.

But even these data

Finally, it is useful to assess the

underestimate the enormity of the extra

sources of changing regulatory require*
•

polation over existing operating exper

ments.

ience.

This is important to the future of

the nuclear industry.

But even more im

As Figure 8 demonstrates, the base

of operating experience at 200 MWe was

portant, the understanding gained from

quite thin.

such an honest appraisal can be applied to

operational NSSS capacity (a measure of

other, nascent energy sources, thus aiding

the depth of experience) to cumulative

in their orderly development.
Four safety-related factors weighed

capacity ordered (a measure of the extra
polation of this experience). Operational

heavily in favor of changes in AEC/NRC

capacity progressed from over 50% of

regulatory requirements:

ordered capacity in the early years of

•

0

©

poorly understood technology which
made it difficult to ascertain how
safe the NSSS really was;
lack of public consensus regarding
nuclear power which made it diffi
cult to establish how safe the
NSSS should be and thus deprived
the AEC and the industry of a fixed
safety target;
the potentially disasterous conse
quences of a nuclear accident which
ensured that indifference would not
be a mitigating factor;

These data relate cumulative

nuclear power to 3.5% in 1967.

Thus, a

very large investment in nuclear power
came to be founded upon a very small
experience base.
The resulting risks were enormous.

For

one thing, the capacity growth was carried
out in an industry in which the conven
tional wisdom considered an extrapolation
of 2 to 1 over operating experience to be
the outer bound of risk.

For another,

growth in plant capacity was achieved by

0

the strong governmental and econom
ic pressures to develop commercial
nuclear power which led to large
scale nuclear commitments despite
the foregoing.

reducing design margins with only moderate
changes in the technology.

As plant size

grew, the safety margins which had been
inherent in the smaller plants decreased,

These circumstances caused the AEC/NRC to

according to the chief scientist in one

adopt a regulatory philosophy which im

reactor firm.

posed essentially open-ended requirements

mean that nuclear plants grew less safe.

on the nuclear industry.

Rather it meant that the ability of the

This did not necessarily

nuclear industry to convincingly demon

LOCA and validate the computer codes used

strate their safety decreased.

in design.

The safety

In addition, LOFT was to have

shown that backup cooling systems were in

analysis was required to extrapolate
further and further from its thin empiri

fact effective and reliable.

cal base.

conceived in 1961 and scheduled for com

At the same time, critical AEC

LOFT was

studies which might have expanded this

pletion in 1966.

empirical base of knowledge were delayed.

been termed by the AEC as the "largest and

3.1.2

Although it had once

most vital" test facility in the safety

AEC Safety Studies

program, preliminary results are only now
The AEC entered the era of commercial

becoming available.

nuclear power with an ambitious safety
program designed to:*
®

e

•

not available to the NSSS vendors through

" . . . develop and establish the
technology, practices, and specifi
cations necessary to upgrade in
dustry standards for designing safe
reactor plants."
" . . . assist in the development of
safety criteria and safety stand
ards which can be used as targets
in plant design and safety evalua
tions to expedite siting decisions.'
" . . . provide the necessary tech
nology on which to base the design
improvements required to assure the
safety of nuclear plants."

out most of the period of this study.
3.1.3

Technological Surprise

As the size of the NSSS increased and
safety research languished, the potential
for technological surprise grew.

developments had a profound effect on the
industry.

The first was the failure of

the AEC1s "semi-scale" tests in the winter
of 1971-72 to verify the conservatism of

these objectives, particularly the last
The first was

earlier.

The second, in 1972, was the

astounding discovery that irradiated fuel

the behavior of fuel rods before and

pellets actually grew denser —

To study this

shrank —

behavior a Power Burst Facility (PBF) was

and hence

rather than swelled as had been

predicted by all previous analyses.

to be constructed at the AEC1s National
Reactor Test Station in Idaho.

Criteria and the reversal of important
core design objectives as discussed

Information was delayed in two part

during an accident.

This resulted in the

hasty promulgation of new ECCS Acceptance

AEC was not entirely successful in meeting

icularly important areas.

In

particular, three totally unexpected

the ECCS designs.
For reasons which are not yet clear, the

one.

Thus, vital research

information regarding reactor safety was

This

revelation produced a major crisis in the

This pro

nuclear industry and temporarily imposed

ject was scheduled for completion in 1967,
but the installation was not ready for

a severe analytical burden on the NSSS
vendors.

research work until late 1971.

The third technological surprise

developed more slowly.

Concern with

Perhaps more important since it pertains

common-mode failure, the simultaneous

directly to the controversial Loss of

failure of a reactor and the safety

Coolant Accident, was the delay in imple

systems designed to mitigate this failure,

menting the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT).

began in 1969.

This was to have been a controlled loss of

resolved beyond an AEC/NRC decree that

coolant which would provide an understand

manufacturers must demonstrate the pro

ing of the behavior of the NSSS during the*

bability of a common-mode failure to be

The issue has not yet been

*J.A. Lieberman, "The AEC Program for Reactor Safety," Proceedings
of the American Power Conference Vol. 23, 1966, pp 307.
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(JCAE) in 1952, the AEC began its program

"negligibly small."

of commercial reactor development even

What is important here is that some 7 to

before passage of the Atomic Energy Act of

10 years after the beginnings of "commer

1954.

cial" nuclear power, major, unexpected
technological problems arose.

From the beginning, two salient

features of this program stand out.

These pro

blems can be interpreted as the tangible

First, the many issues which grew up

manifestation of poorly understood tech

around the early AEC/JCAE policy dealt

nology .

with how civilian nuclear power should be

3.2

developed, not whether it should be devel

PUBLIC CONSENSUS AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS

oped.

At the same time that the nuclear industry

Nation's interest. The only arguments
arose over the terms by which the govern

was unable to demonstrate how safe the
NSSS really was, the lack of public con

ment technology should be made available.

sensus made it difficult to say how safe
nuclear power should be.

There was a remarkable consensus

that civilian nuclear power was in the

Second, the AEC received considerable

Thus there was

criticism regarding the rate at which

no way to discern how much safety was

nuclear power was progressing, particular

enough.

ly during the Strauss chairmanship —
Simultaneously, a 1957 AEC study of the

majority of this opinion held that the

consequences of a major nuclear accident,

development was too slow.

the

Thus, an urgent

WASH 740, gained increasing publicity.

need for the development of nuclear power

Based on a series of tenuous assumptions,

was assumed, and that development was made

this study set a theoretical upper limit

a matter of national policy.

on the public damage resulting from a core
melt-down and containment failure of a

3.3.2

200 MWe plant.

The NSSS vendors also felt great pressure

These figures became wide

The Commercial Perspective

ly known and ensured that public indiffer

to develop commercial nuclear power as

ence would not mitigate the inability of

quickly as possible.

the industry to demonstrate the safety of

experience is an example of this.

the NSSS.

GE decided to build the Dresden I reactor

3.3

would lose from $15 to $20 million on the
plant.

Despite the problems arising from tech

This was rationalized as an R&D

expense, and indeed construction of the

nological uncertainty, a lack of public

plant did serve to clarify many technical

consensus, and the severe consequences of

details.

a reactor accident, strong pressures arose

But GE won only two other orders

until 1963.

for the early development of commercial

Other manufacturers were in

similar straits.

These were generated by

Babcock and Wilcox, for

example, sold the Indian Point I reactor

AEC policy and the NSSS vendors' concept

to Consolidated Edison in 1953, and did

of the light water reactor as an interim

not take another order until 1966.

technology.
3.3.1

When

in 1955, the company recognized that it

PRESSURES TOWARD EARLY COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT

nuclear power.

The General Electric

In the meantime, government efforts to

Atomic Energy Commission
Development Policy

develop advanced converter reactors,
breeder reactors, and other energy tech

At the urging of private industry in 1950

nologies were seen as a long-term threat

and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
345

to the LWR makers.

The development of

important to the takeoff of the nuclear
market. In brief, these are:

these competing machines would limit the
payback period of the light water reactor.

•

capacity constraints on coal produc
tion ,

•

increases in coal and oil prices,

•

reduced availability of gas,

•

public concern with the environ
mental cost of fossil fuels,

•

utility concern with the cost of
pollution control equipment,

•

rising cost of fossil-fired steam
generating equipment,

•

early price sacrifices by NSSS
vendors,

•

the "bandwagon effect" in which
utilities reinforce each others buy
ing behavior.

The means of getting the LWR on line with
the least delay was the turnkey concept.
In 1963, GE began to sell the entire
nuclear plant, not just the NSSS.

The

firm would take responsibility for every
aspect of plant construction at a fixed
price.

The first of the turnkey plants

was Oyster Creek, a 640 MWe plant ordered
from GE by the Jersey Central Power and
Light Co in 1963.

The turnkey price was

estimated at $139/kw, and GE expected to
sell at least three similar units in order
to reduce the financial risk.

However, it

soon became clear that this and other GE
turnkeys could not be built for the prices

4.0

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

charged, and the firm ceased accepting
such contracts in 1966.

It is now clear that the future of nuclear

Fortune magazine

estimates that GE lost money on every

power is very much in doubt, both in the

turnkey plant it built, eventually losing
over $200 million.*

grand vision of cheap, abundant energy

United States and in Western Europe.

The

from the peaceful atom remains only a
Thus, the entry ticket into commercial

dream, and that dream is held by fewer and

nuclear power was quite high for the major
competitors.

To make this sacrifice

worthwhile, GE, for one, explicitly count
ed on large orders for nuclear plants to
offset its earlier turnkey losses.

But it is also clear that

depends upon the availability of energy.
Thus the implications of the nuclear

The

other manufacturers felt a similar motiva
tion.

fewer persons.

much of what we call social progress

experience for future energy development
ought not to be lost.

Thus, strong financial pressures

were added to the public policy incentives

4.1

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE FIRMS

for the rapid development of commercial

Unlike the more traditional regulatory

nuclear power.

activities which control pricing, markets,

3.3.3

and the general conduct of business, pro

Market Conditions

duct regulations directly influence the

Finally market conditions in the mid to

rate and direction of technological change.

late 1960's enabled the policies of rapid
commercial development to succeed.

This influence can be particularly import

Philip

Sporn, in his 1968 testimony before the

ant for firms whose products require
entended development times, heavy R&D

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,

expenditures, and a capital-intensive pro

analyzed several factors which were

duction process.

Such companies cannot

reorient their product in response to
*A.T. Demaree GE's Costly Venture Into the Future", Fortune
October, 1970.
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regulatory concerns without spending great

research from private sources,

amounts of time and corporate resources.

information provides the technical found

(2) the

Thus its important to integrate regulatory

ation needed for regulation, and (3) the

planning into the normal planning cycle of

issues are public rather then private in

the firm.

nature.

To be sure, it will not be

Failure to do this will not make

possible to anticipate regulatory concerns

the concerns go away, but rather will

with a great deal of precision.

direct them into ligitious forums such as

But

neither is it possible to anticipate with

the 1972 AEC hearings which resulted in

great precision market growth, the rise of

the Final Acceptance Criteria for ECCS.

competition, sources of financing, organi

The result may be a wasteful allocation of

zational arrangements, and a host of other

societal resources and missed opportuni

market-oriented factors.

ties for the development of societally

Just as a firm

useful technologies.

would not initiate new product development
without planning for these factors, it

5.0

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

must not do so without considering poten
A native of Missouri, Dr. Bodde graduated

tial regulatory concerns as well.

from the U.S. Military Academy in 1965.
4.2

IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

Following Army service in Korea, Vietnam,

The task of government ought to be to

and the U.S., he entered M.I.T. for

assess as early as possible those aspects

graduate study in Nuclear Engineering

of new technologies which are of potential

(MS, 1972) and Management (MS, 1973).

public concern and to develop the basic

He obtained his doctorate in Management

scientific and technical understanding

of Technology from the' Harvard Business

regarding them.

School in 1975, and joined TRW Energy

This is a legitimate

public expenditure since:

Systems shortly thereafter.

(1) the market

He is now

Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Programs.

mechanism is not adequate to elicit such
NOTE:

SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO.
FIGURE 1. A MANUFACTUER’S PERSPECTIVE OF IMPACT ON THE NSSS
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REGULATION INFLUENCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN A W AY TH A T WAS
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- RESPONSE OF ONE NSSS VENDOR

SOURCE: PWR MANUFACTURERS
FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF REGULATION ON THE NSSS

SOURCE: FSAR & PSAR DATA
FIGURE 3. FUEL ROD PERFORMANCE: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING
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vW

1
j

,

.

CAPACITY OF LARGEST NSS ORDERED
IN YEAR N
MIDDLE LINE = MEAN CAPACITY OF COMMERCIAL
NSS ORDERED IN YEAR N
BOTTOM LINE = CAPACITY OF SMALLEST NSSS
ORDERED IN YEAR N
DASHED LINE - CAPACITY OR LARGEST COMMERCIAL
NSSS OPERATING FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR

DERIVED FROM: U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1974

NO NSSS SOLD IN 1964

WASH 1174-74

FIGURE 4. LWR SIZE GROWTH, MWe

CAPACITY EXTRAPOLATION IN FLUENCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN A WAY THAT WAS . . .

COMPONENT

MAJOR

REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL

■

CORE + INTERNALS

M OD ERATE

777

(s i z e )

v W

(Q UANTITY)

777

CONTROL RODS A ND CRDM'S

MAIN COOLANT PUMPS

(QUANTITY)

777(size a n d / o r

STEAM GENERATORS

777

IN S IG N IF IC A N T

q u a n t it y )

(SIZE AND/OR Q U A N TITY !

7 7 7 (size)

PRESSURIZER

INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS

777

SAFETY AND A U X IL IA R Y SYSTEMS*

777

"NOT CONSIDERED PART OF BASIC NSSS

= RESPONSE OF ONE NSSS VENDOR

SOURCE: PWR MANUFACTURERS
FIGURE 5. EFFECT OF CAPACITY EXTRAPOLATION ON THE NSSS
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| M O D EL

NSSS MODEL
MWe RATING

PRESSURE VESSEL

M AJO R COMPONENTS

CONTROL RODS AND
DRIVES

FUEL ASSEMBLIES

2 LOOP • 12' CORE

3 LOOP • 12' CORE

4 LOOP - 12' CORE

920 MWe

600 MWe

1150 MWe

3 LOOP - 14' CORE*
1000 MWe

132 IN ID
Sz

157 IN ID
Sz

41 CLUSTERS
Q

57 CLUSTERS
Q

65 CLUSTERS
Q

17 X 17 A R R A Y
157 ASSEMBLIES

17 X 17 A R R A Y
193 ASSEMBLIES

17 X 17 A R R A Y
157 ASSEMBLIES

16 X 16 A R R A Y
121 ASSEMBLIES

173 IN ID
Sz

157 IN ID
Sz
57 CLUSTERS
Q

4 LOOP • 14' CORE*
1280 MWe

173 IN ID
Sz
69 CLUSTERS
Q
17 X 17 A R R A Y
193 ASSEMBLIES

CORE INTERNALS

Sz

Sz

Sz

Sz

Sz

PRESSURIZER

Sz

Sz

Sz

Sz

Sz

STEAM GENERATORS

MODEL D

MODEL D

MODEL D

MODEL E

MODEL E

M AIN COOLANT
PUMPS

MODEL 93A1

MODEL 93A1

MODEL 93A1

MODEL 100

MODEL 100

MOTOR HP

7000
S

7000
S

8000
S

SOURCE:

7000
S

D A V ID L. BODDE
"R EG U LA TIO N AND TECHNICAL E VALUATIO N:
A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY
SYSTEM AND COMMERCIAL JET ENGINE"
UNPUBLISHED DOCTORAL THESIS,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF BUSINESS ADM INISTRATION

8000
S

NOTATION:
= 14' COMPONENTS SIM ILAR TO EACH OTHER BUT
DIFFERENT FROM 12' COMPONENTS
S = COMPONENTS TE CHNICA LLY SIM ILAR IN A LL
IMPORTANT WAYS
Q = COMPONENTS SIM ILAR ACROSS PRODUCT
LINE EXCEPT IN QUANTITY
Sz = COMPONENTS SIM ILAR ACROSS PRODUCT
LINE EXCEPT IN SIZE

FIGURE 6. WESTINGHOUSE NSSS PRODUCT LINE: 1974

SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
FIGURE 7. AEC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
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BY END OF
Y E A R .. .

(1)
CUMULATIVE
CAPACITY
ORDERED,
MWe

A L L P R IO R T O 1 9 6 2

(2)
CUMULATIVE
CAPACITY
OPERATIONAL,
MWe

(3)
(2) as %
OF (1)

910

465

5 1 .1

1962

1 ,5 3 5

730

4 7 .6

1963

4 ,0 8 0

795

1 9 .5

1964

4 ,0 8 0

795

1 9 .5

1965

8 ,5 9 1

870

1 0 .1

1966

2 5 ,0 1 4

1 ,7 2 0

6 .9

1967

5 0 ,5 9 0

1 ,7 6 0

3 .5

1968

6 3 ,5 4 7

2 ,7 6 5

4 .4

1969

7 0 ,7 5 0

4 ,0 3 0

5 .7

1970

8 5 ,0 8 0

5 ,8 2 6

6 .8

1971

1 0 4 ,9 7 1

9 ,2 3 2

8 .8

1972

1 4 0 ,6 9 0

1 2 ,1 3 2

8 .6

DERIVED FROM:

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1974
WASH 1174-74.

FIGURE 8. THE DEPTH OF EXPERIENCE: OPERATING CAPACITY VS. ORDERED CAPACITY
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